Trump v the BBC: a legal expert explains how the case could play out
The BBC is the latest media organisation to be targeted by Donald Trump’s highly litigious machine. The fallout over a Panorama episode that included a misleadingly edited clip of the US president’s January 6 2021 speech led to the resignation of two BBC executives, and Trump’s threat to sue the BBC for $1 billion if they do not retract the episode.
litigious machine：诉讼机器
fallout over：因某件事而产生的负面后果、争议或影响
episode：事件，系列内容中的一集
clip：短片、剪辑
executive：公司高层
sue：起诉/控告某人
retract：回收，撤回
How likely is he to succeed if he goes through with such a lawsuit? To answer this, we must look at two distinct issues. First, how defamation laws on the books apply to this situation. And second, how things might actually play out in practice.
lawsuit：诉讼案
defamation：诽谤
play out：事态发展
Defamation laws enable individuals to obtain remedies (such as compensation) when another party makes false allegations that damage their reputation. The BBC has admitted that the Panorama footage was misleading in that it clipped together two parts of Trump’s speech that were actually 50 minutes apart.
obtain：取得，获得
- 更学术、正式的get
remedy：补救措施
compensation：法律赔偿/薪酬
allegation：指控
reputatoin：名誉、声誉
footage：影片片段，镜头素材
However, this by no means ensures that a defamation claim by Trump would succeed. Trump must meet set requirements to prove that the footage was actually defamatory. He would face significant difficulties doing so in both England and the US.
First, Trump’s existing reputation is hardly unblemished, and includes court findings of fraudulent conduct, sexual assault (subject to ongoing litigation in the US), and impeachment for inciting an insurrection against a democratically-elected government (he was later acquitted).
unblemished：完美无瑕的，无瑕疵的，清白的
court：法院、法庭
fraudulent conduct：行为欺诈
ongoing：正在进行的
litigation：诉讼
impeachment：弹劾/指控公职人员不当行为
incite：煽动
insurrection：暴动、起义、叛乱
Furthermore, he won the 2024 US election within a fortnight of the episode’s broadcast. It would therefore be difficult for his lawyers to prove that he suffered reputational harm from this Panorama episode.
Fortnight：十四天
broadcast：播送、播出
suffer：遭受
Truth defences are also available in both jurisdictions. These protect a defendant whose allegations contain minor inaccuracies, as long as the “sting” of the libel – in this case, that Trump’s speech contributed to the storming of the Capitol – is true.
jurisdictions：管辖权
minor：次要的，较小的，未成年的
inaccuracies：不准确，错误
sting：刺、刺痛
libel：诽谤（书面形式）
English defamation law is noted for being claimant-friendly (particularly compared to the US), so suing in this jurisdiction would arguably have been preferable for Trump. But in the UK, a defamation claim must be brought promptly within one year of publication.
claimant：提出索赔的人
arguably：可以说、可认为
preferable：更可取的，更合适的，更优的
promptly：迅速 / 立即
This deadline has passed as the Panorama episode was broadcast in October 2024. So Trump’s defamation claim is time-barred in the UK. He has previously (but unsuccessfully) tried to use data protection law to protect his reputation in the UK due to its longer, six-year limitation period.
time-barred：应超过法定时效而不能提起诉讼的。
Because the Panorama documentary is also available in the US, Trump has instead threatened to bring a claim in the US state of Florida. US law is noted for providing strong free speech protections, particularly for media organisations sued by public figures. In defamation law, media free speech has been safeguarded by the landmark 1964 Supreme Court case New York Times v Sullivan.
documentary：纪录片、记录的、纪实的
threaten：威胁
landmark：地标、里程碑
L.B. Sullivan was a police commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, who sued the Times for publishing an advert that criticised the police (but which contained some minor inaccuracies). The Supreme Court unanimously held that if a public official brings a defamation action, they must meet a higher benchmark than a civilian to succeed.
commissioner：官员、专员
advert：广告
contain：包含、阻止、控制
inaccuracy：不准确之处、错误之处
unanimously：一致的、无异议的
benchmark：基准、标杆；以……为标准/进行比较
civilian：平民（非军人、警察或其他执法人员的普通公民）
They must prove that the defendant made the statement with “actual malice” – that they knew the statement was false, or they made it in reckless disregard of whether it was true. This principle was extended to other “public figures” in later cases. Because actual malice is very hard to establish, it makes defamation actions incredibly difficult to win for politicians.
malice：恶意、故意、蓄意伤害
reckless：鲁莽的、不顾后果的、冒失的
disregard：忽视、漠视
principle：原则 / 准则 / 基本原理 / 基础理论
incredibly：非常、极其、难以置信的
Defamation threats in practice
So the BBC might appear relatively safe if we focus solely on the legal texts. But in practice, there can be large gaps between what legal rules say and how defamation disputes operate in reality. Making legal threats – even those that are spurious or doomed to fail – can still be beneficial to claimants like Trump.
dispute：争端、争论、纠纷
operate：运作、运行、操作、经营
spurious：虚假的、伪造的
doomed：注定失败的，注定毁灭的
As leading US academic RonNell Andersen Jones has explained, these legal threats serve as PR for politicians, and undermine public faith in the journalists seeking to hold them to account.
undermine：削弱、破坏
faith：信心、信任
journalist：记者
seek – 找寻的过程
- 区别于find是找寻的结果
These threats are a form of so-called “Slapp” suit – strategic lawsuits against public participation. Slapps are legal threats made to silence or intimidate critics or those who speak out about matters of public interest.
suit：西装、诉讼、合适
strategic：战略性的
intimidate：恐吓、威胁、让人害怕而顺从
These cases are effective because they leverage the extremely high legal costs of litigation and exploit inequalities in power or resources between parties. Weaker parties are pressured into backing down, even if they have a good prospect of successfully defending themselves against the claim.
leverage：影响力、话语权、利用（资源/优势）达到目的
exploit：利用、开发、榨取
prospect：前景、可能性、机会
Many Slapps never even reach the courts because their targets choose to settle the case rather than risk the expense and stress of litigating. This playbook has served Trump well.
expanse：话费、支出、代价、牺牲
He has a sustained track record of seeking preposterous sums from media organisations on the basis of arguably flimsy claims, including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, CBS and ABC (both of which paid Trump millions to settle the cases). He is no doubt calculating that the BBC will also cave in and settle early.
sustained：持续的、持久的、稳定的、坚持的
preposterous：荒谬的、荒唐的、不合理的
flimsy：脆弱的、薄弱的
Trump’s defamation threat against the BBC places the latter in a precarious position. Though the BBC has a strong legal case on the face of it, it faces the financial constraints of its diminishing publicly-funded budgets, and sustained attack from political and commercial adversaries. It will now have to make a big decision on how to respond and whether to settle, like CBS and ABC before it.
precarious：不固定的、危险的、不确定的
constraint：限制、约束、约束条件
diminish：减少、变小、逐渐降低
fund：基金、资金、资金来源
budget：预算、经费
adversary：对手、敌手、对抗者
The threat of sabotage from China is growing. That’s not an excuse to erode Australians’ freedoms
Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.
And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.
Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.
According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.
For many years, ASIO avoided naming specific countries in public. For the first time, Burgess described Chinese hackers trying to gain access to telecommunications, energy and transport networks. He said high-impact sabotage is now a real threat.
The new message names the state actor directly, as well as the potential for devastating consequences.
The many forms of hard and soft power
To understand why this matters, consider how China’s activities abroad have changed over time.
Past debates in Australia often centred on China’s soft power, or the ability to win influence through “attraction and persuasion”, and sharp power. This involves using covert influence, political pressure and media manipulation to shape public opinion without using force.
Burgess described something different. This threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.
This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.
Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.
The risk of digital authoritarianism – at home
There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.
Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.
Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.
In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.
These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.
Earlier analysis of sharp power in Australia showed the country’s institutions can be both robust and unusually willing to grant the state wide authority.
Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.
Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.
We need to protect democratic norms
This shift is not necessarily improper, but it does carry risks. A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.
It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.
Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.
Australia needs a balanced and sophisticated response.
Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.
China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.
一息不存，道将来契 